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loopholes in the aCa to reduce that cost 
“to less than 1 percent” of $7 
million.
How did they do that? 
They started by making all 
hourly workers part-time 
workers. Goodman points 
out that that’s not as easy as it 
sounds because if one worker 
fails to show up, another 
worker must fill in, and then 
that worker’s hours can jump 
above the 30-hour threshold. 
By the end of the year, that 
had happened to only 58 
employees, who were then 
eligible for mandated health 
insurance the next year. 
So the employers, to 
comply with the law, offered 
those 58 employees “Obam-
acare-compliant health insurance (Bronze 
plans).” Under the law, employers could 
require employees to pay 9.5 percent of 
their annual pre-tax wage for health cov-
erage. a $9-an-hour employee working 
30 hours a week would then pay $111 a 
month in premiums. But because such 
a plan has a high deductible and copay-
ments, it’s not very attractive to a low-
wage, low-income worker. So of those 58 
employees, only one opted for the Bronze 
plan. The rest chose a Minimum Essential 
Coverage (MEC) plan, paid for entirely by 
the employers. That way, the employees 
escaped the aCa fine for being uninsured. 
and employers escaped the fine for not 
offering aCa-compliant health insurance: 
they had offered it, but only one employee 
had taken up the offer.
Problem solved, except for one thing: 
that “problem” was finding the lowest-
cost way for the employers to deal with the 
law. for the employees, there are all sorts 
of problems: Many of them went without 
insurance because they worked under 30 
hours a week, and many had insurance 
before the aCa. Moreover, many of them 
are working fewer hours than before and 
therefore earning less than 
they would if the aCa had 
not been implemented. Does 
anyone think that those unin-
tended consequences, which 
are the opposite of the goals 
that President Obama and 
congressional Democrats 
claimed to want—and prob-
ably did want, are good?
Principles of reform / Good-
man points out the unequal 
treatment that the aCa gives 
to modest-income families. 
In many states, he explains, a 
family with income up to 138 
percent of the poverty level 
would qualify for Medicaid. 
Medicaid spends an average 
of $8,000 per year for a family of four. But 
if someone in the family earned a few extra 
dollars and suddenly the family was just 
over 138 percent, they would lose eligibil-
ity for Medicaid and have to buy insurance 
in a health exchange. Goodman argues 
that the subsidy that the family would 
get in the health exchange, on a $12,000 
annual health insurance policy, would be 
$11,100. That’s pretty unequal treatment.
Goodman lays out six principles of 
health insurance reform and then pro-
poses policy changes based on those prin-
ciples. The principles are choice, fairness, 
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If you think that the Patient Protection and affordable Care act (aCa, also known as Obamacare) is bad because of its expense, the distortions it causes in the labor market, its failure to provide 
people what they really want, and its highly unequal treatment of 
people in similar situations, wait until you read John C. Goodman’s 
A Better Choice: Healthcare Solutions for 
America. You will likely conclude that the 
aCa is even worse than you thought.
That’s the bad news. The good news is 
that Goodman, a health economist and 
senior fellow with the Independent Insti-
tute, proposes reforms that would do more 
for the uninsured than the aCa does, and 
at lower cost, and also would make things 
better for the currently insured. and it 
would do all this while avoiding mandates, 
creating more real competition among 
insurers, and making the health care sector 
more responsive to consumers. Not all of 
his proposals are problem-free, but many 
of them are a step in the right direction. 
Solving ‘the problem’ / I can’t do justice 
to the many problems with the aCa that 
Goodman points out, but a number of 
them are encapsulated in a story that 
he tells about 136 fast-food restaurants 
he studied. The restaurants, he explains, 
“initially employed close to 3,500 work-
ers, about half of whom were full time (30 
hours or more a week).” The potential cost 
of providing health insurance to the full-
time staff “was about $7 million a year.” 
But the employers took advantage of legal 
a Better Choice: 
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universal coverage, portability, patient 
power, and real insurance. Briefly, here’s 
what he means: Choice means that people 
“should be free to choose a health plan 
that fits individual and family needs, 
rather than one designed by bureaucrats 
in Washington.” fairness means that “if 
the government subsidizes health insur-
ance, then the subsidy should be the same 
for everyone at the same income level.” 
“Universal coverage” means that every-
one has health insurance or that the few 
who don’t, under his tax credit proposal 
(more on that below), would get health 
care from “safety-net institutions” in the 
communities in which the uninsured live. 
“Portability” means that people who leave 
jobs can take their health insurance with 
them. “Patient power” means that patients 
make choices between spending on health 
care and spending on other things. “Real 
insurance” means that people buy insur-
ance that reflects their risk, just as with 
auto insurance or life insurance.
Because Goodman believes in choice, 
he would have no mandates requiring 
employers to provide insurance or peo-
ple to get insurance. But if that were the 
case, why would low-income people get 
insurance? Most of them would do so, he 
argues, because of a large tax credit they 
would receive in order to buy it. He would 
make the tax credit $2,500 per adult and 
$1,500 per child. a family with two parents 
and two children, therefore, would get a tax 
credit of $8,000 toward health insurance. 
Even a family with a federal tax liability of 
less than $8,000 would get the whole tax 
credit. The euphemism that Goodman 
and others use for such a credit, which can 
exceed one’s prior tax liability, is that it is 
“refundable.” With no mandates requiring 
specific coverages (e.g., required maternity 
coverage for families that are going to have 
no more children), a family could get a lot 
of health insurance with that $8,000. 
Money problem / How would Goodman 
have the feds fund it? He would end the 
tax-free treatment of employer-provided 
health insurance. Doing so, he estimates, 
would raise $300 billion a year. He would 
also end the aCa subsidies that he esti-
mates to be $200 billion a year. In addi-
tion, he would end government spending 
on indigent care at all levels of government. 
I don’t think that quite gets him there, 
though. Nowhere in the book could I find 
an estimate of the cost of tax credits to 
about 310 million people. But the math 
is not difficult. With about 240 million 
adults, the cost of the tax credit for adults 
would be $600 billion. With about 70 
million U.S. residents under age 18, the 
cost of the tax credit for children would 
be about $105 billion. That roughly $700 
billion total would then require substan-
tial cuts in other government spending. 
Goodman could get there, without other 
cuts in government spending, by making 
the tax credit $2,000 per adult and $1,000 
per child, making the overall cost $550 
billion. But then, of course, that family of 
four would get a tax credit of “only” $6,000 
toward health insurance. 
Goodman grants that even with his 
large proposed tax credit, not everyone 
would buy insurance. How would he han-
dle that? local governments could claim 
the unclaimed tax credits of the residents 
in their area who do not buy insurance and 
use them toward subsidized health care. 
This is the weakest part of his tax credit 
proposal. I laid out some reasons why in 
my review of his earlier book, Priceless, in 
which he made this same proposal (“The 
Price Is Wrong,” fall 2012). I wrote: 
first, the local government doesn’t have 
a strong incentive under Goodman’s 
scheme to use the money well. Second, 
one can imagine a city government 
fighting a county government over who 
gets how much of the block grant.
I think Goodman has far too much faith 
in both the Internal Revenue Service and 
local governments.
and it should be noted that subsidiz-
ing people’s health insurance is an inef-
ficient way of helping many of them. This 
is the bottom line of a study of Oregon 
Medicaid by MIT health economist amy 
finkelstein, Harvard’s Nathaniel Hendren, 
and Dartmouth’s Erzo f. P. luttmer. In 
a recent paper for the National Bureau 
of Economic Research, titled “The Value 
of Medicaid,” they found that that value 
to recipients is only 20 
to 40 cents per dollar of 
spending. 
Covering the high-risk 
/ Goodman, as noted 
above, also believes in 
“real insurance.” That 
is, he wants insurers to 
be allowed to price for risk. He argues that 
because they are no longer allowed to fully 
do this under the aCa (which limits how 
much premiums can differ between low- 
and high-risk people), insurers will try 
to avoid insuring the sick and will seek 
out the healthy. How will they do this? 
By forming narrow networks of doctors 
and hospitals that sick people will find 
less attractive.
One problem, of which Goodman is 
aware, is that when insurers are allowed 
to price for risk, people with pre-existing 
conditions can get insurance but will pay 
dearly for it. How would he handle this 
problem? He would have the aforemen-
tioned tax credit granted only to people 
who bought catastrophic insurance and 
only to people who bought “change of 
health status insurance.” Under the latter, 
health insurers “would pay the extra pre-
mium needed if a person’s health deterio-
rated after becoming insured and he or she 
needed to switch to another health plan.” 
Of course, that is not much comfort for 
those who start with poor health. I don’t 
have a good solution for this problem, but 
Goodman and Obama don’t either. It’s 
a tough problem. The good news is that 
people who start with poor health are a 
small percent of the population.
Allowing local governments to collect 
unused tax credits is the weakest part of 
Goodman’s plan. He has far too much 
faith in the IRS and local governments. 
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Goodman is strongest on the issue on 
which he has always been strong: patient 
power. He points out that most insured 
people would pay their own dollars for 
health insurance that is priced higher than 
the tax credit—and most insurance likely 
would be. as a result, those people would 
pay more attention to the kind of insur-
ance they get and to how they spend their 
own health care dollars. He also points 
out that in two areas of health care where 
patients spend largely their own money—
cosmetic surgery and laser eye surgery—
Having “limited imagination/experience” 
is to not appreciate how one’s perspec-
tive would change in alternative scenarios. 
for example, a healthy, financially secure 
young adult cannot fathom being a poor 
senior citizen in need of medical care. 
“limited willpower” is straightforward 
enough. Young adults who can imagine 
being old and who know how to calculate 
how much income they’ll need in retire-
ment might still have “limited willpower” 
to save regularly. as for “limited objectiv-
ity,” there are many types of this failure. 
Smokers, for instance, may lowball their 
increased risk of cancer, thinking simply 
that it would never afflict them. le Grand 
and New, consistent with behavioral econ-
omists, expect us to think that reasoning 
failure afflicts almost everyone.
Consistent with conventional econo-
mists, the authors assume that individuals 
face tradeoffs—in the case of paternalism, 
between well-being and autonomy. The 
authors “acknowledge that autonomy can 
be ‘placed on the scales’ and weighed against 
an individual’s well-being.” It is possible to 
imagine special cases of individuals giving 
up autonomy in order to obtain greater well-
being. People stranded on a desert island 
might be willing to give up some autonomy 
in order to acquire adequate food, clothing, 
and shelter. le Grand and New try to con-
vince us that not-so-desperate 
individuals will also give up 
some autonomy in order to 
achieve greater well-being.
Policy tools / The tools of 
government paternalism are 
“legal restrictions,” “taxa-
tion,” “subsidy,” and “nudg-
ing or framing.” By legal 
restrictions, the authors 
mean prohibition (of alco-
hol, for instance) or a man-
date (the use of seatbelts, for 
instance). Paternalistic taxes, 
of course, aim to reduce 
behavior such as smoking or 
drinking. Paternalistic sub-
sidies aim to promote activi-
ties such as “the cessation of 
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Classical liberals naturally resist paternalism. Milton friedman wrote that “the paternalistic ground for government activity is in many ways the most troublesome to a liberal; for it involves 
the acceptance of a principle—that some shall decide for others—which 
he finds objectionable in most applications.” Besides cases involving 
“children” and “madmen,” people iden-
tifying as liberal have historically consid-
ered any paternalistic policy to be unac-
ceptable. 
That’s not the case today. In their new 
book, Government Paternalism, Julian le 
Grand of the london School of Economics 
and Bill New, an independent policy ana-
lyst, offer a powerful argument in support 
of government paternalism. In particular, 
they endeavor “to see if they could suc-
cessfully meet what might be thought of 
as the John Stuart Mill challenge: are there 
circumstances in which the individual’s 
own good is sufficient warrant to justify 
a paternalistic intervention?” They define 
government paternalism, describe condi-
tions under which they believe it is justi-
fied, and present three potential scenarios 
for paternalism.
When is paternalism warranted? / after 
reviewing the academic literature on 
paternalism, the authors “conclude that 
a government intervention is paternalis-
tic with respect to an individual if it is 
intended to address a failure of judgment 
by that individual [and] further the indi-
vidual’s own good.” 
By “failure of judgment” 
or “reasoning failure,” they 
mean bad decisionmaking. 
They attribute such failures 
to four separate causes:





To possess “limited technical 
ability” is to struggle with—
or simply ignore—math. 
for example, the buyer of 
a lottery ticket probably 
doesn’t bother to compute 
the probability of winning. 
prices are falling and/or quality is improv-
ing. He gives other examples of changes on 
the supply side—from price competition 
for drugs over the Internet, to retail clin-
ics, to telephone-based practices—that are 
making things better and often cheaper 
for patients. Goodman points out that if 
patients were spending their own money, 
other parts of the health care system would 
respond by making things more consumer-
friendly.
Will we see any of the policy changes that 
Goodman proposes? Time will tell.
Government Paternal-
ism: nanny state or 
Helpful Friend?
By Julian Le Grand  
and Bill new
202 pp.; Princeton  
university Press, 2015
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